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INTRODUCTION
The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously. Any
sound that Winston made, above the level of a very low whisper,
would be picked up by it; moreover, so long as he remained
within the field of vision which the metal plaque commanded, he
could be seen as well as heard. There was of course no way of
knowing whether you were being watched at any given mo-
ment .... It was even conceivable that they watched everybody
all the time .... You had to live--did live, from habit that be-
came instinct-in the assumption that every sound you made was
overheard, and ... every movement scrutinized.'
Although taken from George Orwell's futuristic novel, 1984,
this passage could easily have been written to describe the current
workplace environment of approximately 20 million Americans.2
Increasingly advanced technology allows employers to engage in a
wide range of surreptitious surveillance activities, including moni-
toring all oral communications by employees, tracking every em-
ployee movement in the workplace, searching employee computer
files, and reviewing employee electronic mail (e-mail) and voice
1. GEORGE ORwELL. 1984, at 4 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Inc. 1977) (1949).
2. The computer magazine MacWorld recently hired an established computer con-
sulting company to measure the use of electronic monitoring of employees. The company
surveyed 301 businesses, representing a variety of industries and employing a total of al-
most one million workers. Charles Piller. Bosses with X-Ray Eyes. MACWVORLD. July
1993. at 118. 120. More than 30% of the companies with 1000 or more employees re-
sponded that they routinely monitor employees. Among smaller companies, which general-
ly lack the degree of computer sophistication of larger entities, 21.6% reported monitor-
ing. Id. at 123. Extrapolating this data suggests that approximately 20 million Americans
work in organizations that invade the electronic privacy of workers. These percentages
reflect only monitoring performed through a computer and do not include any monitoring
of employees by telephone. Id.
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mail? Like the Orwellian "Big Brother,, 4 employers can now
monitor every aspect of an employee's workday.5
As a result of this rise in electronic monitoring6 and the use
of increasingly sophisticated software,7 privacy in the workplace is
growing as a labor and employment law issue. Businesses contend
that monitoring to increase employee productivity, efficiency, and
work quality is necessary in order to compete in the global mar-
ketplace.8 Hence, employers maintain that monitoring in the work-
place should remain an unrestricted prerogative of management.
Labor organizations, on the other hand, argue that "concealed sur-
veillance combines the worst features of 19th-century factory labor
relations with 20th-century technology, creating an electronic
sweatshop."9 Just as unacceptable workplace conditions of the
past, like twelve-hour workdays, necessitated government regula-
tion, labor organizations have advocated restrictions to increase the
quality of the workplace environment and to ensure a modicum of
employee privacy and dignity.1" In response, Congress has pro-
posed legislation that would constitute the initial step in construct-
3. Of the employers who reported that they electronically monitor employees, 73.8%
search employee computer files, 41.5% examine employee e-mail. 27.7% read network
messages, and 15A% review employee voice mail. Id. at 123.
4. A key distinction is that in Orwell's 1984, the monitoring was performed by the
government, whereas the monitoring this Note examines is instituted by the employer.
Although monitoring by the government would be restricted by the Fourth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. IV, this restriction does not apply to pri-
vate employer monitoring. See infra Section II(A).
5. For example, employers have monitored conversations in which employees re-
vealed intimate details of a divorce or the existence of a medical condition. In one in-
stance, an employee was instructed by her employer to seek medical attention because
she was spending more than 12 minutes a day in the restroom. Julie G. Shoop, Electron-
ic Monitoring: Is Big Brother at the Office?, TRIAL, Jan. 1992, at 13, 14-15; see also infra
note 157 (detailing the manner in which many companies plan employee activity in incre-
ments of seconds).
6. Studies report that sales of software used to monitor employees are increasing by
50% per year. Laurie Flynn, Big Brother Is Watching You Work: Programs Monitor Use
of Computers, Hous. CHRON., June 20, 1993, at 4.
7. New types of software gaining popularity include programs- capable 'of determin-
ing "what files were accessed, what programs were installed and whether anything was
deleted . . . and even the length of the user's bathroom breaks." Id.
8. See infra Section I(B).
9. Robert G. Boehmer, Artificial Monitoring and Surveillance of Employees: The
Fine Line Dividing the Prudently Managed Enterprise from the Modern Sweatshop, 41
DEPAUL L. REV. 739, 808 (1992) (quoting COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AM., LEGIS.
FACT SHEET No. 101-2-2, SECRET MONITORING 1-2 (1990)).
10. See infra Section I(C).
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ing a legal framework in which to address workplace monitor-
ing.11 The pending Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act 2
(the Act) outlines the privacy rights of employees and the ability
of employers to conduct monitoring.
After a brief overview of the sophistication of electronic mon-
itoring and its current uses, Part I of this Note articulates the ben-
efits of and objections to employer surveillance. Part II examines
the current legal framework for private employer monitoring, in-
cluding the federal and state remedies available to employees. Part
III outlines the general provisions of the proposed federal legisla-
tion. It also discusses and evaluates the emerging legal environ-
ment and the resulting work atmosphere. This Note concludes that
employer policies modeled under the Act's guidelines would create
a work atmosphere advantageous to both employers and em-
ployees.
I. CURRENT USE OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING
BY PRIVATE EMPLOYERS
A. Forms of Monitoring
Electronic monitoring makes it possible for employers to mon-
itor the activities of their employees continuously and secretly. Al-
though electronic monitoring includes a wide range of practices,
three general categories dominate: computer-based monitoring;
telephone call accounting and- service observation; and video sur-
veillance. 3
"Computer-based monitoring allows an employer to review
specific activities of employees who work on computers. This prac-
tice is most pervasive in areas of employment that involve highly
repetitive tasks. 4 For example, many mail sorters and data pro-
cessors perform repetitive activities on computer monitors connect-
ed to a mainframe, allowing employers to record information such
as speed. 5 Although computer-based monitoring is easiest when
11. On April 28, 1993, the Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, H.R. 1900, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), was introduced by Representative Pat Williams of Montana. Sena-
tor Paul Simon of Illinois introduced a companion bill, the Privacy for Consumers and
Workers Act, S. 984, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
12. H.R. 1900, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
13. See Kenneth A. Jenero & Lynne D. Mapes-Riordan, Electronic Monitoring of
Employees and the Elusive "Right to Privacy," 18 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 71. 72 (1992).
14. Id. at 73.
15. Piller, supra note 2, at 118. Although employee activity on a terminal not con-
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repeated tasks are involved, professional and technical employees
are not immune from computer-based monitoring.16 If an employ-
ee's office is equipped with a full-featured computer network, a
manager can eavesdrop on all components of an employee's com-
puter work without the employee's consent and make all data
transferred to the computer an "open book."'7 For example, su-
pervisors can "view the contents of data files and electronic-mail
messages, overwrite private passwords, and audit ... time and
activities on the network.'
18
Telephone call accounting is technology that records the
length, time, and destination of phone calls.'9 Employers use tele-
phone logs for various purposes, including limiting an employee's
personal phone use.20 Unlike telephone call accounting, service
observation permits managers to- monitor the substance of an
employee's telephone conversations.21 If telephone calls constitute
an integral component of employees' work, such as for long-dis-
tance operators, airline reservation agents, and telemarketers, man-
agers use service observation especially to review employees' con-
versations with customers.22
Almost all industries use video surveillance.2' Employers vid-
eotape employees in a variety of situations to detect theft or vio-
lations of employer policies. Surveillance is usually a two-step
process. Employers first install a camera that employees can see
and then add a hidden camera.24 Management also employs video
nected to the mainframe also can be monitored by the employer, the centralization pro-
vided by mainframe connection allows the employer more rapid access to the data, facili-
tating the monitoring of larger numbers of employees.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 118-19.
19. Boehmer, supra note 9, at 755.
20. Id.
21. Note, Addressing the New Hazards of the High Technology Workplace, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1898, 1903 (1991).
22. See Frank J. Cavico, Invasion of Privacy in the Private Employment Sector: Tor-
tious and Ethical Aspects, 30 HouS. L. REV. 1263, 1293 (1993). The Communications
Workers of America (CWA), the major union representing telecommunications workers,
estimates that employers monitor 400 million telephone communications between employ-
ees and consumers per year, an average of 750 calls per minute. Piller, supra note 2, at
118.
23. Jenero & Mapes-Riordan, supra note 13, at 73.
24. See Boehmer, supra note 9. at 757 n.84. The second camera may be greatly
disguised, such as by hiding it in a sprinkling system or a heating duct. Id.
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monitoring to record employee work habits such as movement on
the assembly line.'
B. Benefits of Workplace Monitoring
Employers emphasize that monitoring is critical to improving
employee productivity and to ensuring the quality of work.26 For
example, to increase productivity, employers can use electronic
monitoring to plot the work rate of a particular individual and the
work flow of a group of employees.' Additionally, computer-
based monitoring can chart future work loads to increase produc-
tivity.' Monitoring also reduces the need for managers to give
personal attention to employees because the computer can provide
feedback.29 A variety of industries use computer-based monitoring
to train employees and to check the quality of their work. For
example, service observation of telephone operators allows supervi-
sors to oversee adherence to the employer's quality control guide-
lines on courtesy and salesmanship." Employers also endorse
monitoring as a basis for equitably evaluating an employee's over-
all performance, contending that monitoring functions as an unbi-
ased measure of the quality of an employee's work."
Moreover, managers use electronic monitoring to investigate
possible employee wrongdoing or dishonesty. 2 For example,
25. Jenero & Mapes-Riordan, supra note 13, at 73. In addition to the listed catego-
ries, numerous, monitoring variations exist. For example, public warehouses use radio sig-
nals to monitor forklift operators. Lisa Harrington, Electronic Monitoring Bill: Labor's
Latest Attack on Productivity, TRANSP. & DISTRIBUTION, Sept. 1993. at 75 (quoting
American Warehouse Association President Mike Jenkins). This electronic technology also
permits the manager to measure an operator's efficiency. Id.
26. Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act: Hearing on S. 984 Before the Subcomm.
on Employment and Productivity of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 27-32 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Senate Privacy Hearing] (statement
of John Gerdelman, Senior Vice President, Customer Markets, MCI Communications
Corp.).
27. Piller, supra note 2, at 120.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Robert J. Posch, Jr., Can You Monitor Employee Phone Performance? DIRECT
MARKETINO, Oct. 1993, at 100, 102 ("[R]andom monitoring is essential to ensure that
employees adhere to [the employer's] strict quality-control guidelines pertaining to cus-
tomer contact (courtesy, salesmanship, legal guidelines, etc.).").
31. But see infra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing employees' objections to
the use of monitoring as a review tool).
32. One company uses "tiny, fish-eye lenses installed behind pinholes in walls and
ceilings to watch employees suspected of crimes." Jeffrey Rothfeder et al., Is Your Boss
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many managers view monitoring as a means to combat employee
theft of goods and time. An estimated $370 billion is lost annually
to employee theft in the United States. 33 Employers also are in-
creasingly using electronic surveillance to protect trade secrets and
other intangible property interests.3
As a separate justification, employers view surveillance as
necessary protection against potential liability.35 In addition to the
traditional theory of respondeat superior, "employers now are fre-
quently sued by persons injured by employees based on negligent
hiring, retention, and referral theories. ' 36 The employer is poten-
tially liable under these causes of action even if the employee was
not acting within the scope of employment.37 For example, when
employees have access to sensitive data, employers risk liability if
the employee either intentionally or negligently misuses the data
and injures a third party.38 Along with civil liability, employers
may incur criminal liability for an employee's actions or omis-
sions.39
Spying on You?. Bus. WK., Jan. 15, 1990, at 74. The U.S. Sentencing Commission en-
courages employers to use systems that are designed to identify and prevent criminal
behavior in the workplace. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 8A1.2 cmt. 3(k) (West Supp. 1994);
18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 8C2.5(f) (West Supp. 1994).
33. David W. Arnold et al., Evaluating the Integrity Test, SECURITY MGMT., Apr.
1990, at 62 (citing figures assessing employees' thefts of cash and merchandise at $200
billion in 1988 and employees' thefts of time at $170 billion in 1989).
34. See, e.g., Boehmer, supra note 9, at 744; Piller, supra note 2, at 122.
35. However, a potential problem often overlooked by employers is the evidence that
the electronic monitoring tapes may offer to potential claimants. See, e.g., Deal v. Spears,
980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992) (involving employer tapes that were confiscated and used
as the basis for an employee claim against employer).
36. Boehmer. supra note 9, at 746. Twenty-nine states allow a cause of action based
on these theories.
The essence of negligent hiring or retention liability stems from knowingly hir-
ing (or retaining) an individual who is incompetent and/or possesses unreason-
able risk to others. Hence, the primary way to avoid such liability is to conduct
proper screening and investigation of prospective employees (or to discipline or
discharge an employee who has been hired, but is clearly incompetent or poses
a danger to others).
Id. at 746 n.28 (quoting Donald J. Petersen & Douglas Massengill, The Negligent Hiring
Doctrine-A Growing Dilemma for Employers, 15 EMPLOYMENT REL. L.J. 419, 428-29
(1989-1990)).
37. See id. at 746.
38. See, ,e.g., Djowharzadeh v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 646 P.2d 616, 618-20
(Okla. Ct. App. 1982) (holding bank liable when loan officer disclosed confidential loan
application contents to a third party).
39. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (finding that a company and its
president could be criminally prosecuted under the Federal Food. Drug, and Cosmetic
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Electronic monitoring also can improve compliance with com-
pany policies and safety guidelines.40 For example, dashboard com-
puters designed by trucking companies record a trucker's speed,
the length of rest stops, and the idling time of the engine.'
Trucking companies contend that this monitoring increases driving
safety,42 which in turn may reduce workers' compensation claims
and insurance premiums.4
3
C. Objections to Workplace Monitoring
The primary objection to monitoring arises from its intrusion
into an employee's privacy.' Even narrowly focused monitoring
may intercept personal information.45 Indeed, labor organizations
have catalogued countless illustrations of invasions of employee
privacy.4 6 Some of the more egregious violations involve video-
taping changing rooms. In one such instance, a Maryland hospital
showed the tape of a nurses' locker room on an in-house cable
channel.47 More prevalent are instances of more subtle privacy
violations. For example, an employee who was at home recovering
from surgery received a phone call from a co-worker on break.4
The employer monitored the conversation and "insisted that the
convalescent return to the job, saying that if she was well enough
to talk on the phone, she was well enough to come to work. 49
Labor organizations claim that such examples demonstrate that
monitoring violates the privacy, autonomy, and dignity of both
workers and those outside the workplace with whom they com-
municate."0
Act for allowing adulterated foods into commerce).
40. See, e.g., Piller, supra note 2, at 121.
41. Rothfeder et al., supra note 32, at 74.
42. Id. However, labor leaders contend that companies unfairly use the dashboard
computers to suspend or discharge employees: "If a trucker is just two minutes late, he
can be brought up on charges." Id. at 75.
43. Boehmer, supra note 9, at 747.
44. The American Civil Liberties Union reports that it receives 50,000 employee
monitoring complaints annually. Washington Watch; Someone's Watching, COMMUNICA-
TIONSWEEK, July 12, 1993, at 29.
45. See, e.g., David M. Katz, Electronic Monitoring and The Odor of Fear, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER (PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK BENEFITS MGMT. ED.), Feb. 3, 1992, at 9.
46. See, e.g., 1993 Senate Privacy Hearing, supra note 26, at 18-19 (statement of
Barbara J. Easterling, Secretary-Treasurer of CWA).
47. The Electronic Whip, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 28, 1993, at 2B.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Boehmer. supra note 9, at 769-70. The privacy rights of the individual with
1262 [Vol. 43:1256
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In addition to privacy concerns, employee advocates also cite
the adverse health risks associated with monitoring as a reason to
limit surveillance. A two-year study by the University of Wisconsin
found that workplace monitoring causes physical and emotional
health problems in employees.5 1 The study found a higher inci-
dence of headaches and other physical ailments, such as backaches
and wrist pains, among monitored workers.5 2 Moreover, moni-
tored workers suffered greater fatigue. 3 Psychological problems
included a 12% increase in depression and a 15% increase in
extreme anxiety. 4 The results of the Wisconsin study mirror
those of other studies,55 including one by the National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health. 6 The Institute found that
heavily monitored clerical workers "exhibited a greater degree of
stress, depression, anxiety, instability, fatigue and anger."" Labor
organizations emphasize that the ramifications of increased health
whom the employee is communicating often are overlooked. Companies that have as-
sumed leading roles in consumer privacy concerns, including Citibank, American Express,
and Equifax, "describe their electronic monitoring of employees as strictly limited." Piller,
supra note 2, at 122-23. However, these companies would not release details of their
privacy policies and "acknowledged surveillance practices beyond what would be allowed
by some features of the congressional proposal." Id. at 123. For a discussion of this
proposal, see infra Section III(A).
51. MICHAEL J. SMITH ET AL., UNIVERSITY OF WIS.-MADISON DEP'T OF INDUS.
ENG'G, ELECTRONIC PERFORMANCE MONITORING AND JOB STRESS IN TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS JOBS 1 (1990). The CWA worked in conjunction with the University on the study.
The study compared monitored workers at seven regional Bell Telephone locations with
unmonitored workers at eight regional Bell locations. By using these two groups to con-
trol for other factors, the study attempted to establish a direct causal connection between
stress caused from workplace monitoring and a greater incidence of physical and mental
health infirmities. Id. at 3-4.
52. Id. at 5, 20.
53. Id. at 5-6. 21.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Terry M. Dworkin, Protecting Private Employees From Enhanced Moni-
tormg: Legislative Approaches, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 59, 75 n.90 (1990). Dworkin cites a
study at the University of California-Berkeley finding that workers in highly monitored
jobs encountered more heart problems as a result of the stress than workers in non-mon-
itored jobs. The researchers found that "[t]his was particularly true of women who had
high demand-low control jobs," such as telephone operators. Id.; see also Peter A. Susser,
Electronic Monitoring in the Private Sector: How Closely Should Employers Supervise
Their Workers?, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 575, 579-80 (1988) (reporting findings of the
National Organization of Working Women that monitoring created employee stress and
health-related problems).
56. Electronic Monitoring Blamed for Increased Workplace Stress, OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH & SAFETY LETTER (June 12, 1991).
57. Id.
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risks extend beyond adverse effects to individual workers." The
greater rate of illness may affect the productivity of the entire
workplace unit59 and also can result in increased health costs to
businesses.' The Office of Technology Assessment estimates that
"stress-related symptoms cost United States industry $50 to $75
billion annually in absenteeism, medical expenses, and lost produc-
tivity. ' 61
Although privacy concerns and health risks form the primary
bases to attack monitoring, labor organizations discuss a variety of
additional drawbacks. Employees frequently question the fairness
of the company's use of monitoring to review employee perfor-
mance,62 despite management views of monitoring as a means to
increase consistency in employee evaluations.63 Employees also
cite the potential negative effect on the overall workplace atmo-
sphere.' Furthermore, surveillance may lower an individual's mo-
rale if, for example, an employee believes that monitoring indi-
cates her employer's assumption that she is basically untrustworthy
or unproductive.65
II. LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR PRIVATE EMPLOYERS
A. Constitutional Constraints
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects
individual privacy from government intrusion.66 Hence, the pro-
tection of the Constitution extends only to public employees; pri-
58. See, e.g., 1993 Senate Privacy Hearing, supra note 26, at 19-20 (statement of
Barbara J. Easterling, Secretary-Treasurer of CWA).
59. See, e.g., id.
60. See, e.g., David D. Redell, Safeguard Employees' Privacy, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIB., Oct. 13, 1993, at B5.
61. Susser. supra note 55, at 579.
62. See Elizabeth Lee, Technology, Privacy Clash on Job, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr.
23, 1990, at C1, C3.
63. See supra text accompanying note 31.
64. See, e.g., David D. Redell, Stop Electronic Sweatshops, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEAL-
ER, Oct. 4, 1993, at 7B ("When performance data is gathered without notification and
used for mechanistic decisions about advancement, discipline or even firing, the work
environment can become unbearable.").
65. See Boehmer, supra note 9, at 770. A union leader remarked that employers
subscribe to the motto that "in God we trust. Others we monitor." Id.
66. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing that "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated") (emphasis added).
1264 [Vol. 43:1256
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vate employer behavior toward employees is not restricted. 67
Most states have a constitutional provision that reflects the pro-
scriptions in the Fourth Amendment regarding search and sei-
zure.6 8 Some states, however, have specific constitutional guaran-
tees of privacy that extend beyond the Federal Constitution's pri-
vacy rights.6 9 Only California courts have held that the state con-
stitutional right' of privacy applies with respect to both public
and private employers.71 In all other states, employees have suc-
cessfully invoked the state constitutional right of privacy only after
establishing that the government was the employer.2
In California, an employer may not violate an employee's
reasonable expectation of privacy, as secured under the state con-
stitution, unless the employer can establish a "compelling in-
67. See, e.g., Simmons v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 452 F. Supp. 392, 397 (W.D.
Okla. 1978) (dismissing portion of plaintiffs' complaint alleging that workplace monitoring
of telephone conversation violated Fourth Amendment because private employer was not
subject to the Fourth Amendment), affd, 611 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1979).
68. See Jenero & Mapes-Riordan, supra note 13, at 80.
69. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 ("The right of the people to privacy is recog-
nized and shall not be infringed."); ARIZ. CONsT. art. II, § 8 ("No person shall be dis-
turbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."); CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 1 ("All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable
rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing,
and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.");
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 ("Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free
from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein.");
HANV. CONST. art. 1, § 6 ("The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not
be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest. The legislature shall take
affirmative steps to implement this right."); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The people shall
have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against
unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications
by eavesdropping devices or other means."); LA. CONsT. art. I, § 5 ("Every person shall
be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against un-
reasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of property .... Any person adversely affected
by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this Section shall have standing to raise
its illegality in the appropriate court."); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 ("The right of indi-
vidual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed
without the showing of a compelling state interest."); WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 7 ("No
person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of
law.").
70. CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § 1.
71. Porten v. University of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (Cal. Ct. App.
1976).
72. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 55, at 60 n.5 (stating that only California extends
protection to private employees); see also Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768
P.2d 1123, 1130 (Alaska 1989) (finding that the right to privacy afforded by the Alaska
Constitution does not extend to actions between two private parties).
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terest."'73 This standard places a greater burden on employers
than the "reasonableness" requirement mandated by the U.S.
Supreme Court for Fourth Amendment challenges.74 However,
the employee still faces the difficult hurdle of demonstrating a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.' For activities such as the moni-
toring of changing rooms, for which the employee can establish
the requisite expectation of privacy, the employer's heavier burden
of providing a "compelling interest" may render some actions un-
constitutional that would survive challenges under the U.S. Consti-
tution. However, the change in the standard "is not likely to
change the legal result in cases involving pure service observation
and computerized work measurement."7 6 Those claims will contin-
ue to fail because the employee cannot establish a reasonable
expectation of privacy.77
73. See White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 224-25 (Cal. 1975) (finding that the employer's
failure to articulate a compelling interest could create a cause of action against the em-
ployer on state constitutional grounds of invasion of privacy); Soroka v. Dayton Hudson
Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 84-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that an employer must
show a compelling interest to justify the invasion of privacy resulting from intrusive pre-
employment questions); Luck v. Southern Pac. Trans. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618. 632 (Cal.
Ct. App.) (holding that a private employer operating a railroad did not demonstrate a
compelling interest in testing a programmer for drug use), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 939
(1990).
74. Successful challenges based on the Fourth Amendment right to privacy typically
must pass a two-prong test. First, the employee must establish a subjective expectation of
privacy and demonstrate that the expectation was objectively reasonable. See O'Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717-18 (1987) (O'Connor, White & Powell, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J.,
plurality opinion). In evaluating a Fourth Amendment claim brought by a government
doctor against the government for searching his office, the Court rejected the notion
"that public employees can never have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their place
of work." Id. at 717. However, the Court noted that "the expectation of privacy must be
assessed in the context of the employment relation," including the "operational realities
of the workplace" at issue. Id. For example, employers argue that an employee's expecta-
tion of privacy in computer communication is not objectively reasonable because employ-
ees are working during company time on a company computer with the password on file
with the manager. See Piller, supra note 2. at 122.
Second, the employee must demonstrate that the interception cannot be justified by
business reasons. See Ortega, 480 U.S. at 719-20 (stating that a government doctor's "le-
gitimate expectations of privacy" must be balanced "against the government's need for
supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace").
75. Luck, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
76. Jenero & Mapes-Riordan, supra note 13, at 80.
77. See id. at 79. State constitutional privacy claims involving workplace monitoring
remain largely untested. In two recent disputes, employees have claimed that an
employer's reading of e-mail messages violated the privacy provisions of the California
Constitution. Alana Shoars, a former employee of Epson America. claimed that she was
fired because she questioned her employer's practice of reading e-mail messages sent
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B. Tort Law Constraints
Workers unable to ground a privacy claim in constitutional
provisions may seek a common law tort action. Under the com-
mon law action for invasion of privacy, a private employee may
claim that the electronic monitoring practiced by the employer
constitutes an intrusion into the employee's privacy that would
offend a reasonable person.78 An employee alleging this tort must
surpass several formidable obstacles. First, the employee faces
difficulty in framing the work environment as a sufficiently private
atmosphere.79 Second, the employee must establish the monitor-
ing conduct as highly objectionable." Third, some courts maintain
that publication of the information discerned from the surveillance
must accompany the invasion of privacy." The combination of
these requirements typically defeats the employee's tort claim.'
among other employees. Shoars argued that the monitoring violated both the California
constitutional right to privacy and the state eavesdropping statute. See Piller, supra note
2, at 122. An employer's interception of e-mail also was challenged on state constitutional
grounds by two former employees of Nissan, who maintained that they were fired be-
cause they complained about managers reading personal e-mail messages in the com-
pany's system. Id.
78. "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or se-
clusion of another, or his private concerns, is subject to liability to the other for his
invasion of privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to the reasonable man." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) (emphasis added).
79. See, e.g., Jackson v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 426 S.E.2d 630, 632 (1992) (finding
that the use of a speakerphone to monitor an employee's telephone call was not an
unreasonable intrusion into private affairs, when monitoring was a routine and known
practice of the employer).
80. See Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Tex. 1973) (stating that eavesdrop-
ping forms the basis of a tort action only when the monitoring is conducted in a manner
"to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sen-
sibilities" (citation omitted)); Valencia v. Duval Corp., 645 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1982) (requiring that conduct be "extreme and outrageous" to constitute a claim for
invasion of privacy); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
81. Although the Restatement identifies four possible categories of invasion of privacy,
employee monitoring claims would fall only under the category "Intrusion Upon Seclu-
sion" unless the employer engages in publication of the information obtained. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B-652E. Some courts do not view the four cate-
gories as distinct causes of action. Rather, they hold that the plaintiff must demonstrate
both publication and intrusion into seclusion. See, e.g., Barr v. Arco Chem. Corp., 529 F.
Supp. 1277 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
82. An employee might claim that the employer's violation of privacy constitutes the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress rather than invasion of privacy. Howev-
er, for this cause of action, the employer's conduct must be extreme in degree, outra-
geous in character, and "atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."
Kaminski v. United Parcel Serv.. 501 N.Y.S.2d 871, 873 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (citations
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
In Thomas v. General Electric Co., an employee claimed that
his employer violated his common law right to privacy by taking
his picture despite his request "not to be photographed."' The
pictures recorded the employee's movement in the workplace.4
The employer stated that the pictures were taken in accordance
with the employer's established policy of studying employee ac-
tions to facilitate increasing the efficiency of the operations." The
court dismissed the claim, finding that the plaintiff had failed to
show that the monitoring exceeded the legitimate interest of the
business.86 Barksdale v. International Business Machine Corp.87
also highlights the difficulty an employee faces when trying to
prove a tort violation of invasion of privacy. The Barksdale plain-
tiffs alleged that IBM's monitoring of their work at computer
terminals constituted an invasion of privacy. The court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, stating that "[t]he De-
fendant's observation and record of the number of errors the
Plaintiffs made in tasks that they were instructed to perform can
hardly be considered an intrusion upon the Plaintiffs' 'solitude or
seclusion." "
The difficulty of maintaining a tort claim shows that the com-
mon law cause of action can "provide a source of protection for
employees [only] in those extreme cases in which the employer's
surveillance unduly infringes on personal conversations or activities
without sufficient business justifications." 9 Typically, such situa-
tions involve employer monitoring in areas such as bathrooms and
locker rooms. For instance, in Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Services, Inc.,
the court held that a common law invasion of privacy occurred
when videotape cameras surveilled models' dressing rooms.9"
omitted).
83. 207 F. Supp. 792, 792 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
84. Id. at 793.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 799.
87. 620 F. Supp. 1380 (W.D.N.C. 1985), aff'd, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) No.
2319 at 560 (4th Cir. July 16, 1986).
88. Id. at 1383.
89. Jenero & Mapes-Riordan, supra note 13, at 84.
90. 945 F.2d 1422, 1427 (8th Cir. 1991).
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C. Statutory Constraints
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, as amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986,91 was enacted in response to increasing privacy
threats resulting from the growing use of sophisticated monitoring
devices. Title III generally prohibits the monitoring of wire com-
munications' and oral communications93 unless one of the com-
municating parties has given consent.94 However, the law provides
two exceptions: for law enforcement agencies95 and for em-
ployers.
Law enforcement personnel may monitor lines if the surveil-
lance is necessary in the investigation of certain criminal sus-
pects.97 The law enforcement agency must secure an order before
commencing this monitoring.98 Nationwide, courts authorize fewer
than 1000 such taps annually.99 Conversely, unlike the strictly
channelled exception for law enforcement personnel, private em-
ployers have almost complete freedom to monitor employees."' 0
91. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 211 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2520 (1988)).
92. "Wire communication" is defined as any communication
made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of
communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the
point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such connection
in a switching station) furnished or operated by a person engaged in operating
such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications for
communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1).
93. "[O]ral communication" covers "any oral communication uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying such expectation. ... Id. § 2510(2). The combined definitions
of "wire" and "oral" communications clarify that the statute covers both wiretapping and
electronic eavesdropping, such as bugging phones or listening on an extension. Id. §
2510(1)-(2).
94. Courts have construed the meaning of consent narrowly. For example. in Watkins
v. L.M. Berry & Co.. 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983), the court rejected the notion of im-
plied consent arising from knowledge that the conversation could be monitored.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2).
96. Id. § 2510(4)-(5).
97. Id. § 2516.
98. Id. §§ 2516, 2518.
99. Piller, supra note 2, at 118.
100. Supporters of new congressional action to limit workplace monitoring underscore
the anomaly that private employers are the only group currently exempted from tight
restrictions. As Senator Paul Simon stated, "[i]t is a sad irony that while the Federal
Bureau of Investigation is required by law to obtain a court order to wiretap a conver-
sation, even in cases of national security, employers are permitted to spy at will on their
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Neither the manner nor the extent of employee surveillance is
restricted. Moreover, employers are not required to provide any
type of notice to employees. The only limitation that the law im-
poses on an employer monitoring wire communications of an em-
ployee is that the monitoring be "within the ordinary course of
business."' 01 In construing this requirement, courts have found a
wide variety of monitoring to fall within the ordinary course ofbusiness." 2
The courts have held an employer in violation of Title III
only when the employer excessively monitored personal aspects of
an employee's life. For example, in Deal v. Spears, 3 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's finding that an employer's electronic monitoring violated
Title III."° In Deal, store owners believed that their employee
had a role in a store burglary. The owners secretly recorded and
listened to twenty-two hours of calls that contained highly personal
information, including details of an extramarital affair."t 5 Al-
though the court found that some monitoring would have been
justified,"° it held that the extent to which the owners intercept-
employees and the public." Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act: Hearing on S. 516
Before the Subcomm. on Employment and Productivity of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Senate Privacy
Hearing] (statement of Sen. Paul Simon).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a). For a violation to occur, there must be an "interception"
of the communication, which is defined as "acquisition of the contents of any wire, elec-
tronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other
device." Id. § 2510(4). Thus, there is no interception and no liability if the acquisition is
through an instrument that falls outside the definition of "electronic, mechanical, or other
device." The statute then exempts from the definition of acquisitions those occurring "in
the ordinary course of . . . business." Id. § 2510(5)(a). For example, if a private person
monitors another individual's telephone conversation, an "interception" has occurred un-
der Title III, and the monitoring party may be held liable. However, if the monitoring
party is a business, and the monitoring of the employee occurs within the ordinary
course of business, there is no "interception" and therefore no liability.
102. E.g., Epps v. St. Mary's Hosp. Inc., 802 F.2d 412, 416-17 (11th Cir. 1986) (moni-
toring phone call between employees by another employee acting beyond her authority
deemed to be in the ordinary course of business); Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630
F.2d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that when an employer is concerned about the dis-
closure of confidential information, "it is within the ordinary course of business to listen
in on an extension phone for at least so long as the call involves the type of information
he fears is being disclosed"); Burnett v. State, 789 S.W.2d 376, 378-79 (Tex. Ct. App.
1990) (monitoring telephones to detect theft falls within ordinary course of business ex-
emption).
103. 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992).
104. Id. at 1155.
105. Id. at 1155-56.
106. The court stated that the employers "might legitimately have monitored [the
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ed personal phone calls was "well beyond the boundaries of the
ordinary course of business.""1 7
III. DEVELOPING LEGAL AND WORK ATMOSPHERES
A. Proposed Legislation
Because existing law generally fails to articulate employer
boundaries or employee privacy rights, Representative Pat Wil-
liams of Montana reintroduced 0 8 the Privacy for Consumers and
Workers Act (the Act) in 1993."9 Under the Act, "electronic
monitoring" includes all data collection by any technological de-
vice,11 excluding only wiretapping and electronic transfer of pay-
roll, insurance, or related information."' The Act would regulate
any individual or business entity employing any number of work-
ers.
I12
As currently proposed, the Act would require an employer to
provide general notice to employees and prospective employees
that the employer engages in workplace monitoring."' An em-
ployer could randomly monitor new employees without any ad-
vance notice of the specific surveillance during the first sixty days
of employment." 4 For other employees, the employer would be
employee's] calls to the extent necessary to determine that the calls were personal and
made or received in violation of store policy." Id. at 1158.
107. Id.: see also Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 583 (11th Cir. 1983)
(holding that the monitoring of a personal phone call during the employee's lunch break
was not in the ordinary course of business). If the employee is claiming a violation in an
interception of an oral communication, rather than a wire communication, the employee
must also demonstrate an expectation of privacy that the communication would not be
intercepted. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (defining "oral communication" as including only
that "uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not sub-
ject to interception under circumstances justifying such an expectation").
State interception statutes largely mirror the federal laws and allow monitoring in
the ordinary course of business. See, e.g., Susser. supra note 55, at 589.
108. The employee privacy bills were initially introduced during the 1989-1990 term,
but hearings were not held. Similar bills were introduced during the following congres-
sional terms. Boehmer, supra note 9, at 739 nn.1-2. Although the House and the Senate
have different versions of the bill, this Note discusses the House version.
109. H.R. 1900, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
110. Id. § 2(1)(A).
111. Id. § 2(1)(C).
112. Id. § 2(3).
,113. Id. § 4.
114. Id. § 5(b)(1).
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required to provide individualized notice prior to actual surveil-
lance.' 5 This notice would have to state the days and hours
when the monitoring would occur and the uses for the data col-
lected.116 Moreover, if the monitoring involved employee ex-
changes with customers, the customers would have to be notified
of the monitoring either by a prerecorded message at the onset of
a telephone call or by the prominent placement "in each of its
customer bills [of] a statement that the employer is engaging in
such practice.' 117 In general, employers would be prohibited
from randomly monitoring any long-term employee. 8 Notwith-
standing these notice provisions, an employer could monitor any
employee on the worksite without notice if the employer "has a
reasonable suspicion" that the employee's action "violates criminal
or civil law or constitutes willful gross misconduct." ' Employers
also could monitor employee activity if the basis of the investiga-
tion was possible employee abuse of workers' compensation. 20
Electronic monitoring of bathrooms, locker rooms, and dress-
ing rooms would be generally prohibited.' In addition, the Act
would limit access to monitoring records"' and would afford an
employee the opportunity to review her records.12 Moreover, an
employer would not be able to evaluate work performance or set
production goals or quotas solely on the basis of information ac-
quired by monitoring employees. 24
115. Id. § 4(b). Currently, only 31% of companies that monitor employees give ad-
vance warning. Piller, supra note 2, at 123.
116. H.R. 1900, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(b)(3)-(4) (1993).
117. Id. § 4(d).
118. Id. § 5(a). Employers could not randomly monitor anyone who has been em-
ployed for at least five years, but they could randomly monitor any employee who has
been on the job for 60 days or less. They also could monitor employees who have been
employed less than five years if those employees were in a work group of employees
"engaged in substantially similar work at a common time." Id. § 5(b)(1)-(3).
119. Id. § 5(c)(1)(A).
120. Id. § 13(b).
121. Id. § 9(b). These areas could be monitored if the employer had a reasonable
suspicion that monitoring would reveal violations of civil or criminal law. Id.
122. Id. § 9(d). However, an employer could disclose monitoring data to the public if
the data contained evidence of illegal conduct by a public official or if the data would
have a "direct and substantial effect" on public health or safety. Id.
123. Id. § 7(a).
124. Id. § 8(b)(1). Each violation of the Act would be punishable by a $10,000 civil
fine. Id. § 12(a)(1). Moreover, employees could pursue private actions to seek equitable
relief as well as attorney's fees and costs. Id. § 12(c).
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B. The Need for Congressional Action
Employers possess great control over the functioning of the
workplace."n Historically, however, an employer's ability to dic-
tate the nature of the employment relatibnship has not been abso-
lute. From early child labor laws enacted during the industrial
revolution'26 to the Civil Rights Act of 1964127 to evolving
workplace safety standards," congressional regulations have lim-
ited employer control in the workplace. Federal employment leg-
islation is generally predicated on several findings. First, con-
gressional action arises from employer behavior that abuses indi-
vidual rights or notions of fundamental fairness or sparks public
policy concerns. 29 Concerns of privacy, autonomy, and dignity
implicated by current electronic monitoring abuses fall squarely
within this ambit. Second, labor legislation arises when current
regulation is found inadequate to protect these concerns.' De-
spite the rapidly growing use and sophistication of monitoring, the
legal environment is largely structured on Title III, a statute enact-
ed more than a quarter of a century ago. 3' Attempts to refor-
mulate common law tort actions have failed, thus rendering the
current legal limitations inadequate. As the current prolifera-
tion of monitoring problems illustrates, normal market forces and
125. The continuing decline of organized labor has resulted in employers assuming
even greater control over the workplace. Boehmer, supra note 9, at 741, 763.
126. See, e.g., Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child": Meyer and Pierce and
the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1059-60 (1992).
127. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
128. See, e.g., David J. Kolesar, Cumulative Trauma Disorders: OSHA's General Duty
Clause and the Need for an Ergonomics Standard, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2079, 2082 (1992)
(discussing prosecution of employers under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA) when they violate workplace safety standards by allowing employees to engage
in harmful repetitive motions).
129. See, eg., Clyde W. Summers, The Privatization of Personal Freedoms and Enrich-
ment of Democracy: Some Lessons from Labor Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 689, 723
(discussing Congress's responsibility to protect personal freedoms and noting "that it was
in fact performing its function of protecting personal freedoms, as it did in the Wagner
Act, Landrum-Griffin, Title VII, and OSHA").
130. See, e.g., id. ("Only through the institutions of government can we protect per-
sonal freedoms from private oppression. As lessons from labor law teach, that can be
achieved only through congressional action .... .
131. See supra Section II(C).
132. With the current legal strictures, attempts to create a judicial solution require
extensive reinterpretation of the law. In addition, purely judicial action would result in a
piecemeal policy lacking national uniformity. See Note, supra note 21, at 1914-15.
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self-regulation fail to provide an appropriate regulatory framework
for balancing employer and employee rights.
In a nation where large employers may have workers in multi-
ple state and territorial jurisdictions, federal regulation of labor
policies emphasizes the necessity of national uniformity' 34 A na-
tional labor policy such as the proposed Act would enable the for-
mation of a uniform legal framework. Attempted action on the
state level has been blocked by company threats to move business
to a state without restrictions.135 These abortive attempts by
states to implement state statutes similar to the proposed Act
underscore the need for nationally uniform treatment of employee
monitoring.
As with other workplace issues arising from technological
advancements, such as computer crime 136  and polygraph test-
ing,137 Congress should respond to the advances by enacting fed-
eral regulation. To replace the current amorphous legal standards,
Congress should announce a national policy addressing an
employer's ability to monitor employees and an employee's coun-
tervailing right to privacy in the workplace.
133. See Boehmer, supra note 9. at 806: Note. supra note 21. at 1898.
134. See, e.g., Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org.,
667 F.2d 316, 323 (2d Cir. 1981) (recognizing need to "ensure a consistent body of feder-
al labor law by preempting potentially inconsistent state court adjudication"); NLRB v.
Committee of Interns & Residents, 566 F.2d 810, 816 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that the
need for uniform development of labor law mandates broad federal regulation), cert. de-
nied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
135. For example, in 1981, West Virginia enacted a statute prohibiting telephone mon-
itoring unless the employer adhered to strict guidelines, including using a warning tone
audible to both parties to the conversation. However, the law was amended in 1986 to
permit employers to monitor phone conversations provided that employees had access to
unmonitored telephones for personal use and employees received a general warning that
conversations could be monitored. W. VA. CODE § 61-3-24(c) (1981), amended by W.
VA. CODE § 61-3-24(c) (1986). Labor unions claim that the driving force behind the
amendment was AT&T's threat to cancel plans for a new office in the state capital un-
less the statute was altered. Susser, supra note 55. at 592.
136. See Note, supra note 21, at 1899-1902 (discussing this problem generally).
137. Employers use polygraph testing to check an employee's honesty, for example.
when investigating an allegation of employee theft. For a general discussion on problems
and concerns involving lie detector tests, see Dworkin, supra note 55, at 61-73.
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C. Assessing the Objections to the Privacy for Consumers and
Workers Act
The chief objection to a national policy constructing monitor-
ing guidelines is that any restrictions on monitoring would reduce
the productivity and quality of business. 38 One must, however,
question the extent and even the presence of a conflict between
productivity and privacy. Businesses maintain that a monitoring
law would further inhibit attempts by the United States to increase
worker efficiency and thereby place American companies at a
disadvantage relative to international competitors.139 Despite
these claims, countries currently leading the global economy im-
pose greater restrictions on employee surveillance than the pro-
posed Act would.1 40 For example, Japan and many European
countries tightly restrict selective monitoring. 1
The results of available case studies further question the sup-
posed incompatibility of employee privacy rights and business
productivity. In response to concerns that decreased monitoring
would result in lower quality and productivity, the Office of Tech-
nology Assessment conducted a study of telephone operators and
found that the elimination of secret monitoring resulted in "im-
proved quality of service, fewer customer complaints, [a] decrease
in absenteeism, [a] drop in management costs, [and a] reduction in
employee grievances.' ' 42 AT&T's Hotel Billing Information Sys-
tems in Tempe, Arizona, provides a particularly insightful case
study. Unlike most AT&T system companies, the Tempe office
does not monitor any employees. 43 Yet, the service level of the
138. See, e.g., Jerry Jasinowski, No Way to Fix the Problem, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, Oct. 4, 1993, at 7B ("Employers are concerned because this misguided bill [the
Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act] would make it difficult to ensure the high
productivity, quality products and top flight customer service that are so important in the
competitive global economy of the 1990s.").
139. See 1993 Senate Privacy Hearing, supra note 26. at 30 (statement of John
Gerdelman, Senior Vice President, Customer Markets, MCI Communications Corp.).
140. Piller, supra note 2, at 123. Additionally, American workers are more likely than
Europeans to need protective legislation "because of the absence of strong employee
associations, work environment laws, data protection commissions and legislations, and
traditions requiring that work conditions be jointly set by labor and management." 1991
Senate Privacy Hearing, supra note 100, at 47 (statement of Gary T. Marx, sociology
professor at M.I.T.).
141. 1993 Senate Privacy Hearing, supra note 26, at 2-3 (statement of Sen. Paul Si-
mon).
142. CWA Calls Monitoring "Menace," COMM. DAILY, June 24, 1993, at 3.
143. Marlene C. Piturro, Employee Performance Monitoring... or Meddling, MGMT.
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operators was "rated equal to or better than any comparable office
in the country by AT&T."'"
Moreover, secretly monitoring employees is incompatible with
evolving participatory schemes that American companies are cur-
rently implementing in an effort to regain leadership in interna-
tional productivity.145 Employee participation has been highly ac-
claimed for increasing productivity in the European Community
and in Japan.146  Likewise, cooperative labor-management rela-
tions, like the efforts at Ford,' 47 are succeeding throughout the
REv., May 1989, at 32.
144. Id. Other companies that eliminated or reduced monitoring report similar results.
After C&P Bell of West Virginia ceased the surreptitious electronic monitoring of em-
ployees, it received the top ranking of the entire Bell system in six of twelve customer
satisfaction categories. Overall customer satisfaction was rated at 95.7%. Id.
145. Employee participation in American industry runs a spectrum of different degrees
of involvement. At the minimal end, employee participation is limited to surveys and
questionnaires. At the other end is intense employee involvement, such as profit sharing
and employee ownership. Quality circles, semiautonomous work groups, and labor-man-
agement committees fall in the middle of the spectrum. Joseph B. Ryan, The Encourage-
ment of Labor Management Cooperation: Improving American Productivity Through Revi-
sion of the National Labor Relations Act, 40 UCLA L. REV. 571, 579-80 (1992).
The quality circle is based on the concept that the individuals who are directly
involved in production are in the best position to improve the quality of the product.
Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of Section
8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REV. 499, 506 (1986). A quality circle is defined as "a small group of
workers who meet regularly on a voluntary basis to analyze problems and recommend
solutions to management." HARRY KATZAN, JR.. QUALITY CIRCLE MANAGEMENT 21
(1989). Motorola instituted quality circles and found numerous positive results, including a
25% increase in output and a decrease in turnover. Walter B. Scott, Participative Man-
agement at Motorola-The Results, in QUALITY CIRCLES 229, 232 (Roger W. Berger &
David L. Shores eds., 1986).
One of the most stunning examples of the success of semiautonomous work groups
is the GM-Toyota New United Motor Manufacturing (NUMMI) plant in Fremont, Cali-
fornia. See Paul D. Staudohar, Labor-Management Cooperation at NUMMI, 42 LAB. L.J.
57 (1991). The productivity and quality problems intertwined with intense labor and man-
agement conflict led to the shutdown of the plant in 1982. Id. at 57. The institution of
the participatory model resulted in a dramatic drop in grievances, less absenteeism, and
an employee job satisfaction rate of 90%. Id. at 62. Moreover, the quality of the auto-
mobiles increased. Id. The company also has shown a profit, notwithstanding the promise
not to lay off workers. Id. The success of labor-management committees, a more intense
form of working groups, can be seen in a pilot program by AT&T. Ryan. supra, at 587.
146. See Robert E. Cole, Learning from the Japanese: Prospect and Pitfalls, in QUALI-
TY CIRCLES, supra note 145, at 28, 28-41 (discussing the use of quality control circles in
Japan).
147. The Ford program represents a cooperative effort between management and the
United Auto .Workers. It has resulted in increased productivity and product quality. The
increased production arising from the quality circles at Ford was apparent in the redesign
of assembly line mechanisms. The employees, through the quality circle discussions, added
an automatic shutdown feature that improves quality and minimizes delay. Breakdowns
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United States. Numerous business, labor, and government entities,
including the Department of Labor, have stated that cooperative
labor relations are "essential to the future success of the American
industry."14 Although employee participation programs vary
widely, the basic idea is to improve productivity and efficiency by
creating a more cooperative relationship between management and
employees. 149 Thus, the adversarial relationship created by sur-
reptitiously monitoring the workplace is directly antithetical to the
underpinnings of participatory management programs.5
In addition to adversarial relationships, other factors associat-
ed with employee monitoring decrease productivity. Employers
who monitor employees often experience high turnover rates as a
result, which in turn decreases efficiency.' The decreased work-
place morale15 2 and increased health problems 5 3 caused by em-
ployee monitoring also affect productivity.54 Furthermore, "[b]y
making work into a numbers game, an employer often encourages
counterproductive behavior."' 5 For example, "[i]n order to meet
that previously cost $24,000 now cost $300. Ryan, supra note 145, at 582. Additionally,
the number of grievances fell drastically after the program was implemented and employ-
ee job satisfaction greatly increased. Id. at 582-83. As one employee stated, "[t]he impor-
tant thing is that [employee involvement] makes the worker on the floor feel like some-
body." Id. at 583 (quoting Gerard Tavernier, "Awakening a Sleeping Giant . . . ": Ford's
Employee Involvement Program, in QUALITY CIRCLES, supra note 145, at 222, 227).
148. BUREAU OF LABOR-MGMT. RELATIONS & COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR, FIRST INTERIM REPORT, U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE FUTURE OF LABOR-
MANAGEMENT COOPERATION 25 (1987).
149. See Ryan, supra note 145, at 579-88.
150. Some analysts also find that monitoring creates an adversarial relationship among
co-workers as well as between workers and management. See Marion Z. Goldberg, Elec-
tronic Big Brother Spies on Workers, TRIAL, Aug. 1990, at 75. This relationship is a
product of the competition among workers that many monitoring programs instill. Id. An
adversarial relationship among workers also contravenes the goals of participatory man-
agement.
151. See Jeff Kray & Pamela Robertson, Enhanced Monitoring of White Collar Em-
ployees: Should Employers Be Required to Disclose? 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 131,
164 (1991) (noting that turnover costs "include loss of the experience and training invest-
ed in current employees, the cost incurred while training replacement employees, and the
potential loss of reputation in the market for future employees").
152. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
154. See Piller, supra note 2, at 122 (cautioning that "managers concerned with both
productivity and containing health-insurance costs may find electronic monitoring to be
self defeating" as studies link increased health problems to monitoring); Snoops Put a
Strain on Employee Loyalty, BUS. WK., Jan. 1990, at 94 (noting relationship between em-
ployee morale and decreased productivity).
155. Redell. supra note 60, at B5.
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unfair production goals, some workers feel forced to cut off cus-
tomers, enter incomplete data, 'delete documents from other
workers' files, or even drop paper clips into the machinery to slow
it down.""5 6 Such counterproductive practices greatly decrease
quality.15
7
Although the employer rationale for monitoring based on
productivity and quality fails to withstand scrutiny, several employ-
er justifications do remain, and the proposed Act, quite wisely, ad-
dresses these concerns. First, monitoring is an important tool to
assist in proper training and to instill adherence to quality and
safety guidelines. The Act allows monitoring to continue to serve
these purposes by permitting random, unannounced surveillance of
newly hired employees as well as monitoring of workers employed
up to five years if the employee receives prior notice. 5 Howev-
er, "training is an open process, designed for employee educa-
tion-not an act of continuous, secretive spying."' 59 Second, mon-
itoring is an important way to ensure that employees work within
the confines of company policy and the law. The Act embraces
this function by allowing monitoring without prior notice when the
employer has a reasonable basis to believe an employee has violat-
ed the law or grossly deviated from company practices.16
One business objection to the Act is its unnecessarily broad
provisions. The definition of "electronic monitoring" arguably
should be narrowed. 161 For example, the current definition would
156. Susser. supra note 55. at 580.
157. For example, the pressure to cut customer inquiries short regardless of the
customer's needs is illustrated by the performance requirements for some airline reserva-
tion agents. At one airline agency, "agents are expected to average 109 seconds per call
and 11 seconds between calls, during which time they catch up on paperwork. Work-
ers . . . earn negative points for exceeding the expected average of 109 seconds per call
and for taking any more than 12 minutes in breaks during each shift." Once a worker
accumulated a set number of points, that worker could be fired. Id. at 581. This pressure
to minimize "on the hook time" reduces the level of quality that consumers receive be-
cause employees focus solely on time efficiency. In one instance, a supervisor disconnect-
ed a call to an operator from a suicidal individual because "the length of the call was
'ruining' the average work time (AWT) of the operator...." 1993 Senate Privacy Hear-
ing, supra note 26, at 20 (statement of Barbara J. Easterling, Secretary-Treasurer of
CWA).
158. See supra Section III(A).
159. See Redell, supra note 60, at B5.
160. H.R. 1900. 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(c) (1993).
161. In the proposed Act, electronic monitoring is defined as follows:
[Tihe collection, storage, analysis, or reporting of information concerning an
employee's activities by means of a computer, electronic observation and super-
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limit the monitoring of secure areas in airports and other areas
where the employer should be able to monitor the area for safety
continually regardless of the length of employee service. Similarly,
the broad definition of "employee" should be restructured. Cur-
rently, the Act defines an employee as "any current, former, or
leased employee of an employer."162 Thus, if an employee quits,
an employer would face potential liability for searching the former
employee's computer files to retain important company informa-
tion because that individual would still be a protected employee
under the Act. Likewise, if a current employee were on leave, the
employer might need to gain access to certain information, a situa-
tion for which the Act makes no provision. In these situations, the
Act should allow an employer either to retrieve the necessary in-
formation or to request consent from the employee to retrieve
critical data.
D. Assessing the Merits of the Privacy for Consumers and Work-
ers Act: The Emerging Work Environment
Although employers maintain that unrestricted monitoring
would further certain work objectives, expecting employees to for-
feit all rights to privacy and autonomy on entering the workplace
contrasts with the guiding principles of individual rights underlying
American law. 63 The Act would vest employees with privacy,
dignity, and autonomy rights in two ways. First, the Act would
concretely grant employees certain enumerated rights, such as the
right to notice and the right not to be monitored in a dressing
area." The Act also would provide a remedy for the violation
vision, telephone service observation, telephone call accounting, or other form of
visual, auditory, or computer-based technology which is conducted by any
method other than direct observation by another person, including the following
methods: Transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence
of any nature which are transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, elec-
tromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photo-optical system.
Id. § 2(1)(A).
162. Id. § 2(2).
163. See Jonathan J. Green, Note, Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace: The Need
for Standards, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 438 (1984) (outlining the importance of the right
of privacy in American law), see also Note, supra note 21, at 1914 (discussing the privacy
right as encompassing concerns for human dignity: "[i]f privacy actions were understood
to encompass human dignity concerns . . . privacy doctrine would certainly provide mod-
ern workers with some protection from the current abusive practices").
164. See supra Section Ill(A).
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of the listed provisions.t6 5 Second, the Act would create a sense
of workplace empowerment among previously marginalized work-
ing groups, resulting from the return to the employee of a sense
of control over personal information. Without the Act, employers
can monitor freely almost every word and action of an employee.
The employee lacks any control over personal information; the
"ever-vigilant machines 'watch' every work activity."'" By requir-
ing prior notice and imposing restrictions on employer use of data
collected, the Act would give employees some level of control.
Employees would feel some minimal level of empowerment in the
workplace relationship instead of feeling potentially victimized by
the unfettered, unilateral control of the employer. Concomitant
with the individual's sense of regaining control, the Act's limita-
tions would alleviate "the physical and psychological side effects of
monitoring.
Yet, the Act recognizes that an employee's rights of privacy
and autonomy are not absolute. 67 Although certain provisions
might be excessively broad,6 ' the guiding principles of the Act
balance the right of the employer to maintain a business effec-
tively'69 and the right of the employee to privacy. 7
By improving employee working conditions through limited
monitoring, the Act would especially affect the working environ-
ment in companies in which surveillance is heavily used. Imple-
menting an articulate workplace electronic privacy policy 71 corre-
sponding with the dictates of the Act would greatly reduce the
adversarial relationship between employers and employees that is
often a product of secretive monitoring, thereby fostering a more
cooperative relationship. Such cooperative relationships would
produce a "win-win" situation. 72 Employees would benefit from
165. See supra note 124.
166. Boehmer, supra note 9, at 808 (quoting COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AM.,
LEGIS. FACT SHEET No. 101-2-2, SECRET MONITORING 1-2 (1990)).
167. See supra Section 111(A) (discussing the monitoring rights that employers retain
under the proposed legislation).
168. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
170. See supra Section Il(A) (discussing the monitoring prohibitions under the Act
that vest the employee with certain privacy rights).
171. Passage of the Act would encourage employers to create an employment policy
concerning electronic privacy. Currently, significantly fewer than half of employers sur-
veyed-only 36%-have any written policy regarding employee privacy. Piller, supra note
2, at 123 (citing results of MacWorld poll).
172. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text (detailing the mutually advanta-
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an improved working environment, and employers would profit
from increased productivity.
173
Realizing the opportunity to create this mutually advantageous
situation, some companies already have entered into discussions
with employees to create an internal electronic privacy policy
closely resembling the Act. For example, Northern Telecom, with
input from its employees' union, instituted a companywide policy
that bans any secretive monitoring of employees. As the president
of the CWA stated, "[Iln trials here in the U.S., when companies
have suspended monitoring, their own measures of worker produc-
tivity and quality customer service have improved. The Northern
Telecom policy prohibiting undisclosed monitoring puts the compa-
ny on the cutting edge in ending a practice that fosters distrust,
stress, and poor customer service."' 74
IV. CONCLUSION
Neither current laws nor market forces have produced an
appropriate framework to control the proliferation of sophisticated
monitoring by employers. As with other labor and employment
issues that implicate questions about the intersection between
employer practices and individual rights, congressional action
should create the necessary legal framework. The enactment of the
Consumers and Workers Privacy Act would achieve this goal by
creating nationally uniform legal treatment of monitoring that
would recognize both the legitimate managerial concerns of the
employer and the privacy and autonomy rights of the employee.
Although management opposes the imposition of the Act, the
long-term results of restrictions on monitoring would produce gains
for employers as well as employees. Employers should view the
creation of an electronic monitoring policy as one step toward
forging the cooperative work atmosphere necessary for the United
States to regain a competitive international edge.
geous ramifications when employees and employers engage in cooperative relationships).
173. See id.
174. Northern Telecom Bans Secret Monitoring: CWA Agreement Sets Major Privacy
Precedent, PR NEWSWIRE. Jan. 30. 1992, available in LEXIS. News Library, Wires File.
CWA also reached an agreement with US West, a telephone company in the Western
United States. Shoop, supra note 5, at 14-15. Under the agreement, US West will pro-
vide employees with advance notice of monitoring. A spokesperson for US West stated
that "[t]he philosophy behind [the change] was a natural evolution of a more open and
trusting environment." Id. at 15 (second alteration in original).
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